India’s system for appointing judges to the higher judiciary has remained one of the country’s most important constitutional debates. The central challenge is to find a process that protects judicial independence while also ensuring that the most capable, ethical and suitable candidates are identified.
Judicial Appointment Reform in India: Rethinking the Collegium Through IJMIS
The proposed Indian Judicial Merit & Independence System (IJMIS) offers a possible way to approach this challenge. Rather than demanding the immediate abolition of the Collegium System, the proposal focuses first on improving how judicial talent is discovered, assessed and verified. It suggests testing a new framework before making any major constitutional change.
Why Does India Need to Reconsider Judicial Appointments?
Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts make decisions that affect constitutional rights, government powers, individual liberty, property, commercial disputes and many other areas of public life.
For that reason, judicial appointments cannot be treated as an ordinary recruitment exercise. The system must identify people who possess not only strong legal knowledge but also independence, integrity, sound judgment and the ability to deal fairly with competing arguments.
The debate, therefore, should not be reduced to a simple choice between judicial control and government control.
A stronger question is: How can India create a process that protects judicial independence while making the search for judicial talent wider and the assessment of candidates more evidence-based?
What Is the IJMIS Proposal?
The Indian Judicial Merit & Independence System (IJMIS) is a proposed framework for improving judicial appointments.
Its basic approach is to separate different parts of the process instead of allowing candidate identification, assessment and final selection to depend heavily on the same institutional network.
The proposed framework broadly follows this sequence:
Wider talent discovery → Evidence collection → Independent assessment → Integrity verification → Judicial selection → Constitutional appointment → Periodic review
The proposal does not call for the Collegium to disappear immediately. Instead, it suggests building and testing the supporting infrastructure first.
Creating a National Judicial Talent Pool
One of the central ideas is the creation of a National Judicial Talent Pool.
The purpose would be to identify potential candidates before a particular vacancy arises. This could help move the system away from a reactive approach, where the search for candidates begins only after a position becomes vacant.
Potential candidates could emerge from several sources, including:
- The judicial service
- The independent Bar
- Legal academics and jurists
- Institutional recommendations
- Other recognised sources of legal talent
A wider pool could help reduce the possibility that deserving candidates remain outside consideration simply because they are not part of traditional professional networks.
A Separate Judicial Merit Assessment Authority
The proposal suggests establishing a Judicial Merit Assessment Authority (JMAA).
Importantly, this body would not itself appoint judges.
Its proposed role would be to:
- Gather relevant evidence
- Assess professional competence
- Organise structured evaluations
- Prepare evidence-based candidate profiles
- Present the findings to the body responsible for the constitutional decision
This separation is intended to prevent the assessment body from becoming the final centre of power.
Judicial Merit Should Not Become a Simple Score
The proposal rejects the idea of reducing judicial ability to a single numerical ranking.
A candidate who disposes of cases quickly is not necessarily a better judge. Similarly, a judgment being reversed does not automatically demonstrate poor judicial ability. A highly famous lawyer may not necessarily possess the temperament required for judging, while a less prominent practitioner may have exceptional legal ability.
For this reason, the proposed model uses a Judicial Evidence Profile instead of one overall score.
What Could the Judicial Evidence Profile Examine?
1. Legal Excellence
This could include:
- Understanding of law
- Legal reasoning
- Constitutional knowledge
- Experience with complex matters
- Quality of legal analysis
2. Judicial Capacity
Assessment could consider:
- Judgment-writing ability
- Procedural knowledge
- Case management
- Understanding of precedent
- Ability to balance competing rights
3. Integrity
This area could cover:
- Professional conduct
- Disciplinary history
- Relevant financial disclosures
- Complaints
- Potential conflicts of interest
4. Constitutional Temperament
A judge needs more than technical legal knowledge. The system could therefore examine qualities such as:
- Independence
- Fairness
- Judicial restraint
- Proportionality
- Respect for precedent
- Willingness to engage seriously with opposing arguments
5. Professional Reputation
Professional reputation should ideally be supported by independently verified evidence rather than popularity or personal influence.
The Three-Evidence Approach
Another proposed safeguard is a three-part evidence requirement.
Before reaching the final selection stage, a candidate should have evidence from three separate areas:
- Actual professional record — What has the candidate achieved?
- Independent assessment — How does the candidate perform under structured evaluation?
- Integrity and professional verification — What does independent background verification establish?
The purpose is to ensure that professional reputation or a powerful recommendation does not become the sole basis for selection.
Could Initial Assessment Be Name-Blind?
The proposal also introduces the idea of partial name-blind assessment.
At the initial professional evaluation stage, assessors could, wherever practical, examine anonymised legal work instead of immediately seeing the candidate’s name, seniority or institutional background.
The identity of a candidate cannot realistically remain hidden throughout the entire appointment process. However, an initial anonymised assessment could reduce the influence of:
- Professional fame
- Family connections
- Institutional reputation
- Personal familiarity
The goal would not be perfect anonymity. It would simply be to ensure that the first assessment focuses more heavily on demonstrated legal ability.
Judicial Simulations Could Test Real-World Ability
The proposed system could also use practical judicial simulations.
A shortlisted candidate might be given a difficult legal problem involving:
- Statutory provisions
- Constitutional questions
- Conflicting precedents
- Disputed facts
- Procedural issues
- Competing rights
The candidate could then be asked to prepare a draft order or judgment, address counterarguments and participate in a short oral exercise.
This would not be intended as another conventional examination. Instead, it would attempt to understand how a candidate reasons through a complicated legal problem.
Testing the Ability to Understand the Opposing View
A further proposed assessment is a dissent-style test.
Candidates could be asked to explain:
- The strongest argument supporting a particular legal position
- The strongest argument against it
- Their own final conclusion
This approach is designed to test whether a prospective judge can fairly understand an argument that conflicts with their preferred conclusion.
That quality can be particularly important in constitutional adjudication, where judges regularly have to balance competing rights and legal principles.
Integrity Should Be a Basic Requirement
The proposal makes an important distinction between legal ability and integrity.
Integrity should not simply be another factor that can be offset by exceptional legal knowledge.
In other words, a candidate with outstanding legal skills should not be considered suitable for judicial office if serious and unresolved integrity concerns exist.
This makes integrity a threshold requirement, rather than just another component in a mathematical score.
Managing Conflicts of Interest
A separate conflict review could identify relationships that may require greater scrutiny.
These might include:
- Family relationships with judges
- Previous professional associations
- Common clients
- Former partnerships
- Significant financial connections
- Previous employment
- Other material professional relationships
However, the existence of a relationship would not necessarily mean automatic disqualification.
The better approach could be disclosure followed by enhanced scrutiny, depending on the nature and seriousness of the connection.
Measuring Professional Network Concentration
One concern in any appointment system is whether successful candidates repeatedly come from a narrow group of professional networks.
The proposal therefore suggests collecting aggregate data showing where candidates come from and how many are:
- Considered
- Shortlisted
- Ultimately appointed
Such information could help reveal whether the candidate pool is genuinely broad.
A concentration of appointments within one network would not automatically prove favouritism. However, repeated concentration could become a reason for closer examination.
The Selection Concentration Index
The proposal introduces the idea of a Selection Concentration Index (SCI).
It could examine the distribution of successful candidates across areas such as:
- Chambers
- Law firms
- Professional institutions
- Geographic backgrounds
- Previous employers
- Judicial-family connections
- Other professional networks
A consistently high concentration could trigger an independent review.
The purpose would not be to penalise candidates who happen to come from successful institutions. Instead, it would ask whether equally capable people outside those networks are being overlooked.
The Missed Talent Question
Most selection systems focus on people who were ultimately chosen.
The proposed framework asks another important question:
Who did the system overlook?
Candidates who narrowly miss selection could, subject to privacy protections, be monitored for institutional learning.
A later review could examine whether some repeatedly overlooked candidates eventually demonstrated exceptional professional or judicial performance.
If the same selection method repeatedly misses strong candidates, that could indicate that the methodology itself needs improvement.
A Judicial Selection Council
Once merit assessment and integrity verification are completed, the proposal envisages a constitutionally protected Judicial Selection Council for final recommendations.
The suggested model includes a strong judicial presence, potentially involving:
- The Chief Justice of India
- Senior Supreme Court judges
- A High Court Chief Justice
- A retired judge
- A distinguished legal academic or jurist
- An independent non-political public member with relevant constitutional expertise
The exact composition would require extensive constitutional consideration.
The central principle, however, is that judges should retain a decisive role in final selection while candidate discovery and professional assessment are not confined to the judiciary alone.
Why Keep Political Control Limited?
The government has legitimate responsibilities in the appointment process, including relevant verification and constitutional processing.
However, giving the political executive unrestricted control over judicial appointments could create concerns about judicial independence.
Under the proposed model, government objections would ideally be:
- Specific
- Evidence-based
- Legally relevant
- Properly documented
Instead of a general objection, the government would need to identify the relevant information and explain why it matters.
Where confidentiality permits, an appropriate opportunity to respond could also be considered.
Accountability Without Political Control
The proposal also suggests an Explain-or-Reconsider approach.
If the final selection body chooses a candidate despite an assessment that points toward another candidate, the decision should not automatically become invalid.
However, the departure from significant assessment evidence should be capable of explanation.
This creates a balance between two principles:
Institutional discretion and institutional accountability.
Addressing Judicial Vacancies
Judicial reform is incomplete if vacancies continue to remain unfilled for long periods.
The proposal therefore recommends maintaining a continuously updated talent pool.
Candidates could broadly be placed into three categories:
Ready
Candidates who are immediately eligible for consideration.
Near Ready
Candidates expected to become eligible in the relatively near future.
Emerging
Strong potential candidates who may become suitable for future appointments.
This changes the approach from:
Vacancy → Search → Delay
to:
Continuous talent identification → Vacancy → Faster consideration
The source proposal cites Department of Justice data showing significant vacancies in the higher judiciary as of June 1, 2026, including 333 High Court vacancies against a sanctioned strength of 1,122 and six Supreme Court vacancies against a sanctioned strength of 38.
A More Predictable Appointment Timeline
The proposed system suggests beginning the process before an expected vacancy.
A possible timeline could look like this:
- 12 months before: Begin talent assessment
- 9 months before: Establish the candidate pool
- 6 months before: Complete merit assessment
- 3 months before: Complete integrity and conflict checks
- At vacancy: Final recommendation substantially prepared
The exact timelines would require careful constitutional and administrative design, but the broader idea is to prepare for predictable vacancies rather than treating them as unexpected events.
Higher Standards for Supreme Court Appointments
Appointments to the Supreme Court could require an even more demanding assessment.
Factors could include:
- Constitutional jurisprudence
- Quality of legal reasoning
- Institutional judgment
- Independence
- Judicial temperament
- Ability to handle complex constitutional questions
- Consistency
- Institutional leadership
The framework could consider both outstanding High Court judges and exceptional members of the Bar rather than automatically treating one route as superior.
What the Proposal Does Not Recommend
The IJMIS approach deliberately avoids several models.
No Complete Government Control
Such a structure could create risks for judicial independence.
No Political Confirmation Hearings
Parliamentary-style hearings could make judicial appointments more political.
No Pure Examination Model
Judicial ability cannot be captured through examination performance alone.
No AI-Based Ranking of Judges
Algorithms can introduce forms of bias that may be difficult to detect.
No Pure Seniority System
Length of service does not necessarily equal judicial excellence.
No Reputation-Only Model
Professional reputation can be influenced by networks and perceptions.
No Single Numerical Score
Any single metric could become distorted or manipulated.
No Immediate Abolition of the Collegium
The proposal favours a gradual, evidence-based transition instead of an abrupt constitutional confrontation.
A Three-Stage Reform Plan
The proposed transition can be understood in three broad stages.
Phase 1: Build the Assessment System
The existing constitutional mechanism would remain in place.
An independent merit-assessment structure would be created to prepare detailed evidence dossiers for candidates.
The initial goal would therefore be to improve the information available to decision-makers rather than immediately changing the constitutional authority itself.
Phase 2: Test the Model
The new framework would operate alongside the existing system.
Its performance could be measured on:
- Candidate quality
- Diversity of candidate sources
- Appointment speed
- Network concentration
- Assessment reliability
- Integrity findings
- Missed talent
- Later professional performance
If the model performs poorly, it should be modified or abandoned.
Phase 3: Consider Constitutional Change
Only after sufficient evidence has been collected should India consider whether a constitutional amendment is necessary.
This creates a more cautious path:
Build → Test → Measure → Prove → Then consider constitutional reform.
Historical Back-Testing
Before changing the constitutional framework, the proposal suggests testing the model against historical appointments.
For example, appointments from the previous several years could be examined without revealing candidate identities to the assessors at the initial stage.
The assessment results could then be compared with actual appointments.
If the new methodology consistently identifies candidates whom independent experts consider stronger, that would provide evidence supporting the reform.
If it performs worse, that would be an equally important finding.
A serious reform proposal must be willing to accept the possibility that its own model may not work.
Proposed 18-Month Pilot
The proposal recommends testing the framework initially in two High Courts.
The pilot would function as a shadow selection system, meaning it would not override the existing constitutional appointment mechanism.
The proposed pilot would run for approximately 18 months and could involve around 200–300 candidates, subject to actual eligibility and vacancy conditions.
The source gives a preliminary planning estimate of ₹10–20 crore, while making clear that this is a policy estimate rather than an official government cost.
How Should the Pilot Be Judged?
The success of the proposed system could be evaluated across five broad areas:
Merit
- Quality of the candidate pool
- Reliability of assessments
- Independent expert review
Independence
- Political interference
- Government objections
- Judicial independence
Transparency
- Documentation
- Completeness of records
- Reasons for significant departures
Efficiency
- Time taken from anticipated vacancy to recommendation
- Duration of vacancies
- Processing time
Fairness
- Diversity of candidate sources
- Professional-network concentration
- Missed talent
- Conflict disclosures
Five-Year Institutional Audit
The system should not be considered successful merely because it works during its initial launch.
A periodic independent audit could ask:
- Who was considered?
- Who reached the shortlist?
- Who was appointed?
- Why were those candidates chosen?
- Who was overlooked?
- Were particular networks disproportionately represented?
- Were appointments made on time?
- Did government objections materially affect the process?
- Was judicial independence protected?
- Did the system discover strong candidates outside traditional networks?
- Most importantly, did it help produce better judges?
If the answer is consistently negative, the system should be changed.
Is IJMIS Simply Another Version of NJAC?
The proposal distinguishes itself from the National Judicial Appointments Commission debate.
NJAC primarily focused on the composition and structure of the appointment body.
IJMIS, by contrast, first focuses on the candidate pipeline, evidence collection, merit assessment and verification process.
That distinction is important because the proposal does not suggest that simply changing the membership of an appointment body will automatically solve problems surrounding judicial selection.
Constitutional Considerations
Any permanent replacement of the Collegium would require careful constitutional consideration.
Articles 124 and 217 govern appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts, while the Judges Cases and the Supreme Court’s 2015 NJAC judgment form an important part of the constitutional background.
Therefore, a cautious approach would be to improve the supporting machinery first and consider constitutional restructuring only after the proposed system has generated meaningful evidence.
What Could the Long-Term Model Look Like?
If a pilot proves successful, the proposal envisages consideration of a Judicial Selection Council of India.
Such a body could potentially have:
- A judicial majority
- Fixed terms
- Institutional independence
- An independent secretariat
- Clearly defined selection standards
- Strong conflict-of-interest safeguards
- Time-bound procedures
- Reasoned decision-making
- Protection against political veto
- Regular independent audits
The important point is that such a council should not be created simply because the existing system is unpopular. There should first be evidence that the proposed institutional architecture actually produces better outcomes.
The Proposed System as a Complete Chain
The broader architecture can be understood as:
Legal community and citizens
↓
National Judicial Talent Pool
↓
Judicial Merit Assessment Authority
↓
Independent Integrity and Conflict Review
↓
Judicial Selection Council
↓
Constitutional Appointment
↓
Judicial Training and Institutional Support
↓
Independent Five-Year Audit
↓
Improved Selection Framework
The idea is to create a continuous institutional learning process in which appointment data can be evaluated and the system can improve over time.
The Bigger Question: Who Gets Missed?
The most important contribution of this proposal may not be the suggestion of a new council.
It is the idea that an appointment system should examine not only whom it selects, but also whom it repeatedly overlooks.
A system can appear successful on the surface while still missing talented people because they come from less visible professional backgrounds.
Tracking missed talent could therefore help identify weaknesses that ordinary appointment statistics may not reveal.
Conclusion
The debate over judicial appointments in India should move beyond the simple question of whether the Collegium System or the government should control appointments.
The larger objective should be to build a framework that combines:
Judicial independence + genuine merit + wider talent discovery + integrity + transparency + efficiency + accountability.
The proposed IJMIS framework attempts to achieve that through independent assessment, a national talent pool, integrity verification, partial anonymisation, practical judicial simulations, network-concentration analysis and periodic audits.
Most importantly, it does not call for the Collegium to be abolished immediately. Instead, it proposes building an alternative assessment structure, testing it against historical and real-world data, conducting a controlled pilot and considering constitutional reform only if the evidence supports the change.
The central idea can be put simply:
Judicial independence should remain protected, but the search for judicial talent can become broader, more systematic and more evidence-driven.
India does not necessarily have to choose between judicial independence and accountability. A carefully designed system could aim to protect both.